her right to her worn clothes that are in existence. She retains possession of her clothes and all of the other items that she brought with her to the marriage that have not been worn out.

The tanna teaches a baraita before Rav Naḥman: A woman who was licentious lost her right to her extant, worn clothes, i.e., when they divorce, she does not keep her clothing. He said to him: If she was unfaithful and engaged in sexual intercourse with another, were her items also licentious? Certainly she is not penalized by losing her right to her property, and therefore teach the opposite: A woman who was licentious has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

Similarly, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This baraita taught by the tanna is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem, the unattributed, as his opinion is cited in several places as the unattributed mishna. However, the Rabbis say that if she was licentious, she has not lost her right to her extant worn clothes.

§ The mishna teaches that if, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rav Huna said: An ailonit is a wife and she is not a wife, while a widow who is married to a High Priest is entirely a wife.

The Gemara explains: An ailonit is sometimes treated as a wife and she is sometimes not treated as a wife. How so? If he knew about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract like any other wife. But if he did not know about her that she was an ailonit before marrying her, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entirely considered a wife. Whether he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her whether he did not know this about her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

And Rav Yehuda says: Both the ailonit and the widow are sometimes treated as a wife and sometimes not treated as a wife. Even in the case of a widow who marries a High Priest, if he knew about her that she was a widow before marrying her, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. But if he did not know about her that she was a widow, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna’s statement from a baraita: If he married the woman with the presumption that she is so, that she has some deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, and it is found that she is so as he thought from the start, then she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. One can infer from here: If he married her without specification, and it turns out that she has a deficiency or that she is forbidden to him, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

The Gemara answers: Do not say this implies that if he married her without specification she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. Rather, say the following inference: If he married her with the presumption that she is not so and it is found that she is so, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.

The Gemara asks: But if he married her without specification, what would the halakha be? The halakha would be that she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If that is the case, instead of teaching the case where he married her with the presumption that she is so and she is found to be so and she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, let him teach us the case where he marries her without specification. If in a case where he marries her without specification she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract, then all the more so in this case, where he marries her knowingly, she must be entitled to it.

And further, it is taught explicitly in another baraita: If he married her knowing that she has a deficiency, and it is found that she does have the deficiency as was known, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. If he married her without specification, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.

The Gemara explains: Rav Huna was misled by the language of the mishna and made an inference that caused him to say something that is not in keeping with the halakha. He thought that since the mishna differentiates between a case where the husband was aware of her situation and a case where he was not aware with regard to an ailonit, but the mishna does not differentiate with regard to a widow, by inference one can say that with regard to a widow, even where one merely marries her without knowing that she is a widow, she is entitled to payment of her marriage contract. In truth, however, that is not so. When the mishna teaches the halakha of the widow, it is based on the differentiation stated with regard to the ailonit. The mishna intended for the distinction between whether the husband was aware of her situation before the marriage, which was stated in the case of an ailonit, to apply in the case of the widow as well.

May we return to you chapter, ''A widow is provided for.''

MISHNA: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years.

If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives.

And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.

If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her.

The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.

GEMARA: It was stated with regard to one who says to another: I am obligated to pay you one hundred dinars, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, and Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

The Gemara seeks to clarify: What are the circumstances of this case? If he said to the people present: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Reish Lakish, who exempts him from payment? He confessed before witnesses that he owes the money. If he did not say to them: You are my witnesses, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates him to pay?

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where he did not say to those present: You are my witnesses. However, here we are dealing with a case where he said to the other: I am obligated to give you one hundred dinars, and he did so in a contract, i.e., he gave him an unsigned contract in which he stated that he is obligated to give him one hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated to pay, since his word given through a contract is legally as authoritative as one who said to the bystanders: You are my witnesses. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt from payment, because his word given through a contract is legally not sufficiently authoritative to be considered a bona fide admission.

The Gemara presents a challenge to the opinion of Reish Lakish. We learned in the mishna: One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years, is obligated to sustain her for five years. What, is it not that the mishna is discussing a case like this, where he gave her a contract that lacks proper signatures and it is nevertheless legally binding, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say otherwise, where is the novelty in the teaching of the mishna?